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Attaining Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically 
Modified Cultivation?  
Mary Dobbs 
ABSTRACT 
The cultivation of genetically modified (GM) crops in the EU is highly harmonised, 
but with persisting conflicts over authority. The Commission responded to internal 
and external pressures with a more flexible approach to coexistence, a proposed opt-
out clause and a promise to review the existing EU GM regime, providing an 
opportunity to consider and suggest paths of development. This article considers the 
post-authorisation policy-making powers of Member States and subnational regions, 
in light of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance. It considers the different 
approaches to risk-centred issues and more general policy choices. Overall, the 
developments occurring at the EU level are strengthening subsidiarity-based 
multilevel governance within the GM cultivation regime, but with significant 
opportunities to improve it further through focussing on the complementary powers, 
coordination and the regional levels in particular. 
 
Keywords: genetically modified organisms; multilevel governance; subsidiarity. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article addresses the highly contentious issue of the allocation of policy-making 
making powers regarding genetically modified (GM) cultivation. It provides an initial 
foray into determining where these powers ought to lie, in light of subsidiarity-based 
multilevel governance, and whether the current European Union (EU) regime 
achieves this effectively in relation to post-authorisation powers. This is, to say the 
least, a bold endeavour and what follows is not proffered as a panacea for governing 
GM crops – the very contention and complexity that increases the importance of 
attempting to develop a normative approach also means that no simple solution is 
available. The intention is simply to steer the debate in new directions and provide a 
focus point for considering where powers should lie in principle. 
It does so because of the on-going conflict within the EU over these powers, the 
constant stalemates and the tweaks and adjustments that occur in a reactionary 
manner. Thus, in a supposedly highly-harmonised regime, Member States have called 
for further powers to limit or exclude cultivation within their territories 1  and 
subnational regions have established a network of GM-free regions.2 Only MON810 
is currently authorised for cultivation in the EU and national bans persist, despite the 
Commission’s belief that they are in breach of EU law.3 France even re-introduced a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 E.g. note submitted by Austrian Delegation, Genetically Modified Organisms – A Way Forward (25 
June 2009): http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st11/st11226-re01.en09.pdf. 
2  E.g. map dated September 2012: http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/gmo-free-regions/maps.html; 
‘Charter of the Regions and Local Authorities of Europe on the Subject of Coexistence of Genetically 
Modified Crops with Traditional and Organic Farming’ (Florence, 2005). 
3 Commission Communication on the freedom for Member States to decide on the cultivation of 
genetically modified crops COM(2010) 380 final, fn 4. 
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national ban on the cultivation of GM maize, 4  despite its own Conseil d’Etat 
previously striking down a similar ban on the basis of EU law,5 and Hungary 
amended its Constitution in 2011 to prohibit GM cultivation.  
As a result of these internal pressures, along with external pressures from sources 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO),6 the Commission instigated a number 
of compromises to the regime. These include the 2010 Cultivation Package, with its 
more flexible approach to coexistence measures7 and proposed ‘opt-out’ clause for 
Member States.8 Directive 2015/4129 enacted a revised version of this opt-out, which 
enables Member States to request or potentially impose geographical restrictions on 
GM cultivation within their territories. Together these provide a degree of 
decentralisation in what was an area of maximum harmonisation and may temporarily 
appease the Member States and regions. However, it is questionable whether even 
these substantial changes will ultimately resolve the battle over authority, or whether 
they will just act as a temporary patch. In the long run, a more proactive approach 
may be required – one that considers specifically where relevant powers ought to rest.  
A significant challenge in this task is that the regions, Member States and EU all have 
vested interests in GM cultivation, which overlap and conflict, due to its multisectoral 
and multilevel nature.10 There is no singular ideal or obvious location to situate 
policy-making powers. Yet, this very challenge highlights a potential starting point – 
that of multilevel governance – as it may be necessary to fragment authority across 
the levels.11 However, multilevel governance alone cannot suffice for our purposes, as 
it lacks a normative value.  
This article builds upon the existing academic discourse on multilevel governance12 
by applying it conjunction with the broad, interdisciplinary concept of subsidiarity – 
thereby developing a normative framework with which to analyse GM cultivation and 
the allocation of powers (Section 2). It considers the appropriate levels for various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Loi n° 2014-567 du 2 juin 2014 relative à l’interdiction de la mise en culture des variétés de maïs 
génétiquement modifié.  
5 Arrêté of the Conseil d’Etat, Association génerale des producteurs de maïs (AGPM) et autres, 1 
August 2013. 
6 E.g. F Randour, C Janssens and T Delreux, ‘The cultivation of genetically modified organisms in the 
European Union: a necessary trade-off?’ (2014) 52 J.Com.Mar.St. 1. 
7 Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the development of national co-existence measures 
to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops, [2010] OJ C200/1. 
8 Proposal for a Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member 
States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in their Territory COM(2010)375. 
9 Directive 2015/412/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending 
Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory, [2015] OJ L68/1. 
10 E.g. GC Shaffer and MA Pollack, ‘The EU Regulatory System for GMOs’ in M Everson and E Vos 
(eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated: Facing the Unknown in National, EU and International Law, 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2008). See Section 3 below. 
11 M Lee, ‘The Ambiguity of Multi-Level Governance and (De-)Harmonisation in EU Environmental 
Law’ (2012) 15 CYELS 357, 358. 
12 E.g. Shaffer and MA Pollack (n10); Randour, Janssens and Delreux (n6); M Lee, ‘Multi-level 
Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and Hierarchy’ in 
L Bodiguel and MN Cardwell (eds), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative 
Approaches, (OUP, 2010); and M Weimer, ‘The Right to Adopt Post-Market Restrictions of 
Genetically Modified Crops in the EU - A Shift from De-Centralised Multi-Level to Centralised 
Governance in the Case of GM Foods’ (2012) 3 EJRR 445. 
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policy-making powers regarding GM cultivation in light of subsidiarity-based 
multilevel governance (Section 3). It proceeds to analyse the key post-authorisation 
roles left for Member States and subnational regions in the EU GM cultivation regime 
(Section 4). The resulting analysis necessarily remains relatively broad-stroke and 
more nuanced approaches may be required in practice, but nonetheless some 
important initial conclusions can be drawn. 
It is argued that subsidiarity-based multilevel governance calls for the core policy-
making powers regarding environmental and health risks to be located at the EU 
level, but with important complementary policy-making powers to be located at the 
national and regional levels. In contrast, it is argued that the opposite approach should 
be taken to policy-making powers not directly related to risk, but with controls still in 
place to protect the internal market. Further, it is argued that substantial coordination 
is required, in light of the complicated mishmash of powers and the nature of GM 
cultivation.  
Overall, the discussion below indicates that the regime is developing towards the 
powers resting at the appropriate loci. This is especially due to the partial de-
harmonisation that has occurred since 2010, whereby environmental and health 
aspects remain harmonised but a range of other post-authorisation powers have been 
relocated with the Member States. However, significant challenges remain regarding 
the extremely limited complementary powers regarding risk, the heavy reliance of 
regional bodies on their Member States and the lack of broad coordination regarding 
cultivation.   
However, before any such arguments can be developed, it is necessary to consider 
what the concepts of multilevel governance and subsidiarity entail and how they can 
assist in this task. 
2. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF 
SUBSIDIARITY 
Multilevel governance recognises the existence of governance at the supranational, 
national and subnational levels, encompassing two aspects. Firstly, it is broader than 
pure government. The actors governing may be private bodies and the mechanisms 
may be softer/broader than binding rules, e.g. social dialogue or open methods of 
coordination.13 Secondly, and the focus herein, the governance occurs at various 
levels, e.g. local, regional, national, transnational and/or international, rather than the 
traditional national or state-centric focus. 14  Therefore, the various levels have 
implementing powers, but also discrete policy-making powers regarding aspects 
traditionally determined by the nation-state.15 Whilst national executives remain of 
vital significance, they no longer monopolise policy-making. Simply, it implies the 
‘reallocation of authority upwards, downwards and sideways from central states’.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 J Scott and DM Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New approaches to Governance in the EU’ (2002) 
8 ELJ 1. 
14 E.g. ‘Multi-Level Governance in the EU’, in L Hooghe and G Marks, Multi-level governance and 
European integration, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
15 Paralleling multilevel regulation, e.g. N Chowdhury and RA Wessel, ‘Conceptualising Multilevel 
Regulation in the EU: A Legal Translation of Multilevel Governance? (2012) 18:3 ELJ 335. 
16 L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance’ 
(2003) 97(2) APSR 233, 233. 
Accepted	  by	  the	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Law	  –	  at	  copy-­‐editing	  stage	  and	  to	  be	  published	  in	  2016.	  	  	  
	   4	  
However, multilevel governance traditionally is deployed as a descriptive or 
analytical tool. To play a normative role, some other concept is required to direct how 
the powers should be divided and assigned.17 A useful tool in this respect is the 
concept of subsidiarity, which provides guidance as to the initial allocation, re-
distribution and indeed use of powers in multilevel governance systems – it focuses 
on ‘the proper geographic distribution of power.’18 
Subsidiarity is most obviously found in an EU legal context, where it is traditionally 
applied regarding shared competences and the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States.19 Under this (vertical)20 understanding, it protects the Member States 
from the EU encroaching excessively upon their powers and could be considered to 
reflect the general approach of federalism.21 However, although illustrative, this 
article is not limited to the legal interpretation of the EU’s principle of subsidiarity.  
The concept of subsidiarity is of broader relevance and application.22 Whether one 
considers an economic version or the historical Catholic version, 23  or an 
amalgamation of these, subsidiarity moves away from the (federalist) vision of power 
held at merely two tiers.24 Even Article 5(3) TEU now provides that: ‘the Union shall 
only act if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central or at regional and local level, but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
at Union level’ (emphasis added). Furthermore, subsidiarity indicates that ‘higher 
levels must not replace the lower ones, but help them… via active intervention and 
support, when the lower institutions alone are not able to guarantee the adequate 
continuation of the social purpose in question [or] by guaranteeing, and respecting, 
the autonomy of lower-level organisations whenever they are capable of achieving the 
given purpose.’25 
Subsidiarity, for the purpose of initially allocating powers, therefore focuses on lower 
levels that are closer to the populace26 – but with the possibility that it might be 
appropriate to relocate these powers upwards, where for example the lower levels are 
ineffective. Hence, a general understanding of subsidiarity calls for powers to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 W Vandenbruwaene, ‘Multi-level Governance Through a Constitutional Prism’ (2014) 2 MJECL 
229, 229.  
18 M Landy and SM Teles, ‘Beyond Devolution: From subsidiarity to mutuality’ in K Nicolaidis and R 
Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union (OUP, 2001), 414. 
19 E.g. A Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique, (OUP, 2002), 91. 
20  Cf. horizontal subsidiarity: A Colombo, ‘Principle of Subsidiarity and Lombard: theoretical 
background and empirical implementation’ in A Colombo (ed), Subsidiarity governance: theoretical 
and empirical models, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 5-6. 
21 E.g. RK Vischer, ‘Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution’ (2001-2) 35 
Indiana Law Review 103, 126. 
22 Commission, ‘European Governance-A White Paper’, COM(2001) 428 final, [2001] OJ C287/1, 8; S 
Weatherill, ‘The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union’ in S Weatherill and U 
Bernitz (eds), The role of regions and sub-national actors in Europe (Hart, 2005), 2 states that 
‘subsidiarity as a general notion of good practice should doubtless equally apply to the relationships 
between different tiers of governance within the Member States’ (original emphasis). 
23 Vischer (n21). 
24 Y Blank, ‘Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global 
Multilevel Governance’ (2009) 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal 509, 545-6. 
25 Colombo (n20), 6.  
26 Estella (n19), 81, considers that there is a negative bias in favour of lower levels and against 
integration. 
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located initially, for instance, at the subnational, then national, supranational (EU) or 
international level as required.27  
2.1 Legitimacy of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance 
However, multilevel governance, whether directed by subsidiarity or otherwise, poses 
a significant issue regarding sovereignty and legitimacy. Sovereignty and authority 
claims traditionally focus on the nation-state, 28  as reflected in Westphalian 
sovereignty and state-centric governance. Thus the EU’s multilevel nature, reflected 
in the ‘multiple, intermeshing competences, complementary policy functions and 
variable lines of authority’,29 challenges the overall authority of the nation-state and, 
thereby, the legitimacy of the EU regime and legislation. 30  However, if one 
‘recalibrates’31 the initial premise of legitimacy away from Westphalian sovereignty, 
multilevel governance has the potential to support the legitimacy of the resulting 
approaches and system as a whole.32 This is especially the case when it is applied in 
conjunction with subsidiarity with its starting point in decentralisation but with a 
willingness to be ‘upwardly mobile’ where appropriate. 
If one casts aside the commonly ingrained belief that policy-making powers should 
rest with the nation-state, decentralisation can be wonderfully logical. Democratically 
founded nation-states gain their authority typically from ‘the will of the people’ and 
thus receive a mandate to represent their people. Yet, even within a nation, the people 
are rarely homogenous and frequently multiple cultures exist separate from the 
majority and, in effect, ruling culture. The nation-state may manage the heterogeneity 
effectively, for instance through dialogue with community representatives. However, 
voices of minorities can easily be lost and submerged in furtherance of the ‘national’ 
approach. Consequently, more localised representation can represent the populace 
with greater accuracy. It thereby may have a greater legitimacy claim than the higher 
legislative bodies intended to represent the entire populace, especially where 
heterogeneity exists.33 This clearly does not mean that the nation-state should be 
disbanded or that regions are so distinct that they should necessarily leave the nation-
state, but indicates that they at least should have some relevant powers.34 
Further, the lower the body, the greater their local knowledge and expertise is likely 
to be, e.g. regarding the cultures, societal values, business interests, traditions, and 
geographical, environmental and climatic conditions present.35 Therefore, locals tend 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 K Van Kersbergen and B Verbeek, ‘Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European 
Union’ (2004) 2 Comparative European Politics 142, 144. 
28 E.g. F Hinsley, Sovereignty, (CUP, 1986), 158. 
29 G Marks, L Hooghe, and K Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980’s: State-Centric v Multi-
level governance’ (1996) 34:3 J.Com.Mar.St. 341, 342. 
30 C Shore, ‘“European Governance” or Governmentality? The European Commission and the Future 
of Democratic Governance’ (2011) 17 ELJ 287. 
31 Vandenbruwaene (n17), at 237-8. 
32 E.g. C Scott, ‘The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control’ (2002) 
8 ELJ 59. 
33 This unfortunately does not facilitate non-geographically clustered minority viewpoints.  
34 J Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European 
Union (Cavendish, 2002), 3-16 and 34-6. 
35 Regarding local knowledge, generally: F Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment (Duke 
University Press, 2000), Part III; environmental: CM Raymond et al, ‘Integrating local and scientific 
knowledge for environmental management’ (2010) 91:8 Journal of Environmental Management 1766; 
and agricultural: M Carolan, ‘Sustainable agriculture, science and the co-production of ‘expert’ 
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to have localised expertise and insight, which is not necessarily available to, or at 
least not an integral part of the general knowledge of, individuals from other areas 
who are representing the overall nation. Consequently, just as with the 
implementation or enforcement of policies, subnational bodies may be the appropriate 
place to develop some policies. Overall, they can provide a more localised approach 
based on relevant knowledge specific to the area and which reflects the values of the 
populace.  
However, decentralisation is not a panacea, suffers limitations and may not even be 
desired by those on the ground. Instead, the nature of the issue or the context may call 
for decision-making at the transnational or global levels, e.g. regarding climate 
change and trade. Higher levels tend to have greater access to resources (e.g. 
scientific expertise and financial), reduce the likelihood of externalities (by 
internalising them in effect) and, through a hierarchical approach, may reduce 
conflicting and inefficient approaches.  
Thus, neither a centralised nor a decentralised approach is perfect for every occasion, 
but either may be more appropriate in different contexts. 36  Subsidiarity takes 
advantage of this, by starting with a decentralised approach and moving to the 
centralised approach where more desirable – or, from the EU’s perspective, where 
necessary and adding value.37 
Therefore, subsidiarity-based multilevel governance ‘may determine the most proper 
level for the exercise of power in terms of relative efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy.’38 It casts aside the ‘privileged position’ of the nation-state, providing a 
framework for determining the allocation of power, 39  with a potential strong 
foundation in both input and output democracy,40 if applied appropriately.41 It also 
simply provides an alternative viewpoint for considering a contentious area, where the 
traditional approach has been ‘all-or-nothing’ and conflict dominates. 
2.2 Challenges for operationalizing Subsidiarity-based Multilevel governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knowledge: the value of interactional expertise’ (2006) 11:4 Local Environment: the International 
Journal of Justice and Sustainability 1354. 
36 C Coglianese and K Nicolaidis, ‘Securing Subsidiarity: the institutional design of federalism in the 
United States and Europe’ in Nicolaidis and Howse (n18), 278-9. 
37 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’, SEC(2009) 92, 21. 
38  W Vandenbruwaene, ‘The legal enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity’ E-(2014) 6:2 
Perspectives on Federalism 45, http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/004_Volume%206%20-
%20issue%202%20-%202014.pdf#page=58, E-48. Similarly Hooghe and Marks (n16), 235-6. 
39 Hopkins (n34), 28-9. 
40 E.g. F Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, (OUP, 1999), Introduction and 
Chapter 1; and VA Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: input, 
output and ‘throughput’’ (2013) 61 Political Studies 2. Traditionally democracy theory focuses more 
on input (government by the people), whilst output democracy considers also ‘the common interests of 
the constituency’ (Scharpf at 11) (government for the people). 
41 C Scott, ‘Governing without law or governing without government? New-ish governance the 
legitimacy of the EU’ (2009) 15 ELJ 160; and Vandenbruwaene (n38), E-51-2. 
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However, subsidiarity-based multilevel governance, which calls for powers to be 
located at the most appropriate level(s), leads to a very tangled web and raises 
numerous challenges and risks.42  
Identifying appropriate levels  
The most fundamental challenge is identifying the ‘optimal’ or appropriate43 level(s) 
for the allocation of powers (and indeed controls). This initially involves locating the 
core policy-making powers at the appropriate level(s), rather than automatically 
assigning them to the EU or national level. It also involves identifying the appropriate 
level(s) for any complementary/residual policy-making powers.44 Core powers would 
encompass, for instance, the ability to set highly-detailed general standards, levels of 
protection and stances on an issue that will apply within the relevant territory, unless 
exceptions or limitations are applicable. Complementary/residual powers may involve 
for instance limited and controlled possibilities to increase/reduce levels of protection, 
derogate from the central approach or develop standards. The boundary between core 
and residual/complementary powers may not always be clear or precise, with a sliding 
scale where powers shift from one level to another. Further, this identification of the 
loci will rarely be entirely straightforward and the manner of its achievement will 
vary widely. 45  This is not helped by subsidiarity’s interdisciplinary nature, 
encompassing legal, political and economic aspects.46 Nonetheless, (overlapping) 
criteria are identifiable 47  that reflect the two components of subsidiarity: input 
democracy and output democracy/efficiency.  
First and foremost, one must identify the interests at stake, how important these issues 
are to the various levels, 48  what degree of homogeneity/consensus or 
heterogeneity/conflict exists in relation to the issues and to what extent the higher 
levels could accommodate the elements of heterogeneity. These elements primarily 
will indicate how important it is to allocate powers at the lower levels. 
Second, one must consider elements relating to efficiency, including: where the 
expertise and relevant resources lie; what impacts the decisions will have beyond the 
initial jurisdiction or territory and whether these can be internalised; and how 
elements of heterogeneity would impact upon centralised actions. From an economic 
perspective, this therefore includes consideration of externalities and economies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See C Charbit, ‘Governance of Public Policies in Decentralised Contexts – The Multi-level 
Approach’ OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 2011/04, OECD Publishing, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg883pkxkhc-en,14-6; and Estella (n19), 98-9 and 112-4 in particular. 
43 Coglianese and Nicolaidis (n36), 277-8. 
44 Similarly for ‘supporting’ (encompassing implementation and enforcement) powers. 
45 Charbit (n42), 13-5. 
46 E.g. G de Búrca, ‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’  (2000) Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 7/99, https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/files/database/000036001-
000037000/000036601.pdf; and Commission, ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’ COM(2015)211, 21. 
47 E.g. de Búrca (n46), 31-2; J van Zeben, The Allocation of Regulatory Competence in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (CUP, 2014), 12 and 55-6; SI Karlsson, ‘Allocating responsibilities in 
multi-level governance for sustainable development’ (2007) 34 International Journal of Social 
Economics 103; and J Pelkman, European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis, (3rd edn, 
Pearson, 2006), 40-1 (N.B. this test is expressly limited as a functionality test in the EU context). 
48 Comparable to the ‘concern principle’ in Karlsson (n47), 108-9. 
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scale.49 Some of these elements also reflect the ‘gaps’ that the OECD considers 
challenge effective and coherent multilevel governance, 50  e.g. those relating to 
capacity,51 funding and administrative boundaries. If the gaps at the lower level are so 
significant or substantial that another level would be much more efficient, then it may 
indicate that the allocation of some or all powers to another level may be appropriate 
in the circumstances.52 However, elsewhere it may be that the gaps may be resolved 
and instead relate more to the effective operationalisation of multilevel governance 
once the powers have been assigned.53 
Finally it is necessary to evaluate whether the combined considerations favour 
centralising or decentralising powers. This involves an intricate balancing act, for 
which there is no clear-cut tipping point.54 However, due to subsidiarity’s preference 
for lower level action, there needs to be a clear advantage in not merely the possibility 
of centralising policy-making powers, but in the nature and degree of centralisation 
also. If the issues are fundamental to the local level, with significant degrees of 
heterogeneity across the broader territory, then input democracy weighs heavily in 
favour of allocating the powers at the lower levels. This then increases the burden to 
establish the need for greater centralisation. If there is little heterogeneity, but 
considerable chance of externalities, then centralisation becomes more justifiable. 
However, even where efficiency calls for centralisation of powers, this does not mean 
centralising all powers or even the core powers – it is only to the extent required by 
considerations of efficiency, which impacts upon the detail, nature and permanency of 
any allocation and exercise of powers. 
Significantly, if a relocation of authority is required, this will involve convincing the 
levels currently holding or controlling the division of power that such relocation is 
preferable. Furthermore, wherever the powers are initially allocated, it is necessary 
that controls exist that prevent a body misusing or even abusing their powers, e.g. 
through judicial challenges of actions as ultra vires or making the allocation of 
powers conditional.55 
Maintaining coherence 
Once the powers have been allocated, there remains the challenge of maintaining an 
appropriate degree of cohesion or coherence.56 This is because powers may now be 
dispersed vertically or horizontally, with overlapping competences at the different 
levels – whether related to single or multiple issues, within or across regimes. The 
complexity increases where multiple focuses for powers exist in a specific area, e.g. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 E.g. M Gilroy, V Seiler and H Schreckenberg, ‘Subsidiarity between economic freedom and 
harmonized regulation: Is there an Optimal Degree of European Integration?’ (2013) 10:2 Federal 
Governance 3; Article 5(3) TEU; and Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Guidelines’, (n37), 22. 
50 Charbit (n42), 15-6. 
51 Karlsson (n47), 108. 
52 R Stoa, ‘Decentralization of Water Resources Management’ (2014) 10:2 Utrecht Law Review 31. 
53 E.g. Charbit (n42), 16-21. 
54 This also increases enforcement challenges regarding subsidiarity within the EU, e.g. S Constantin, 
‘Rethinking Subsidiarity and the Balance of Powers in the EU in Light of the Lisbon Treaty and 
Beyond’ (2008) 4 CYELP 151; and Estella (n19), at 137-174 regarding the Court’s display of 
‘prudence’. 
55 Coglianese and Nicolaidis (n36). 
56 OECD, Water Governance in OECD Countries: A Multi-level Approach, (2011) OECD Studies on 
Water, OECD Publishing, 19; and COM(2001)428, 7-8. 
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regarding trade, employment, health and the environment.57 At the very least, the 
‘functional interconnection between regulatory areas, and within the same regulatory 
area among different regulatory levels, makes the task of establishing clear dividing 
lines difficult.’58 This may potentially lead to inefficient use of resources and conflicts 
between and across the different levels, including internal and external to the nation-
state. 59  Consequently, it is also necessary to ensure coordination 60  and the 
development of harmonising structures/principles61 to varying degrees.  
In hierarchical situations with substantial harmonisation, coordination will typically 
automatically occur in line with the higher levels’ policy decisions. Yet, some 
minimal coordination remains essential where policy-making powers in an area are 
held over multiple levels (vertical coordination) or at several loci on the same level 
(horizontal coordination). This can be achieved via traditional government tools or 
wider governance approaches also, e.g. an overarching framework with minimum 
core standards and principles or through networks facilitating communication.  
Conclusions on operationalizing subsidiarity-based multilevel governance 
Thus, subsidiarity-based multilevel governance does not necessitate that the requisite 
powers be present solely at one level or with one institution. It instead asks where the 
appropriate levels are for the core and complementary powers and then how to ensure 
coherency. It starts with some degree of preference for allocating the powers at the 
lower levels, which can be countered to varying degrees depending on factors 
impacting upon output democracy/efficiency. However, it is by no means a precise 
formula and the intricacies and overlapping issues within an area can make 
identifying the relevant loci and subsequently maintaining coherence a formidable 
task. Although challenging, subsidiarity-based multilevel governance is feasible62 and 
a worthwhile endeavour to investigate. The following section undertakes an initial 
identification of potential appropriate loci for relevant powers. 
 
3. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE FOR GM CULTIVATION?  
In considering the potential application of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance to 
the EU GM regime, one must first consider briefly the nature of GM cultivation as a 
form of agriculture that involves adaptation of DNA.  
Nature of GM cultivation 
Firstly, as a form of agriculture, GM cultivation plays a multifunctional role in 
society63 and interacts with a wide-range of regimes and issues, including property 
rights, the market, society, farmer and consumer interests, environmental protection 
and health protection. These interactions are complex, occurring across sectors and 
levels. For instance, agricultural activities are impacted upon by local climatic, 
environmental and geographical conditions and affect a range of issues central to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 E.g. regarding water policy: OECD (n56). 
58 Estella (n19), 114. 
59 E.g. Chowdhury and Wessel (n15), 339; and Hooghe and Marks (n16), 239. 
60 Landy and Teles (n18), 414; and Vandenbruwaene, (n17), 231. 
61 COM(2001)428. 
62 E.g. Colombo (n20). 
63  Council Decision 2006/144/EC on Community strategic guidelines for rural development 
(programming period 2007 to 2013) [2006] OJ L 55/20, Recital 2 and Guidelines, Section 2.1. 
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local societies.64 Consequently an entirely uniform approach to agriculture is not 
practically possible,65 as evidenced by the Lisbon Treaty listing agriculture as an area 
of shared competence (Article 4 TFEU) and the current Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) reform providing greater freedom for Member States and potentially for 
regions.  
However, agriculture is also directly relevant to the national, European and global 
levels, exemplified regarding trade and environmental protection. Consequently, CAP 
remains with some significant harmonisation at the EU level, e.g. regarding product 
standards, production practices, labelling, monitoring and traceability. Similarly, 
WTO instruments such as GATT, the SPS and TBT Agreements, and the Agreement 
on Agriculture are all applicable.  
Furthermore, due to the environment’s permeable nature and plants’ propagation 
capacity, cultivation decisions at one location/level impact upon cultivation decisions 
elsewhere, irrespective of level and objectives. This is highlighted by the substantial 
difficulty currently in cultivating GM crops alongside non-GM crops without 
admixture (presence of GMOs in non-GM crops) occurring and one agri-type 
dominating over another,66 i.e. harmonious coexistence. Therefore, the degree of 
practical choice (even where a legal one exists) for a legislative body or a producer 
may be significantly restricted by choices made elsewhere.67  
Secondly, as GM cultivation results from adapting DNA, including across species, 
this entails both increased scientific uncertainty and moral concerns. Traditionally, 
science provides legitimacy in risk management, as subsequent decisions are founded 
upon objective ‘truth’ and thereby scientific rationality. 68  However, whilst 
fundamentally important in assessing the risks and benefits, science cannot provide 
definitive answers for instance regarding the rate of outcrossing (spread of GM 
material into other organisms) or how non-target organisms will be affected. 
Consequently, the same scientific evidence is capable of alternative interpretations 
and occasionally dissenting minority opinions regarding GMOs are visible even 
within the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).69 Linked to this, moral questions 
arise over, for instance, interfering with nature, the potential benefits and risks, double 
standards (e.g. if willing to import GM products but not to cultivate GM crops) and 
responsibilities owed to the world at large (e.g. if not willing to cultivate GM crops 
that might assist countries suffering from drought or malnutrition).  
Together, these characteristics demonstrate the complexity in attempting to determine 
where authority should be allocated and help explain the continued conflict over GM 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  E.g. L Bodiguel, ‘Le territoire, vecteur de la reconnaissance juridique de l’agriculture 
multifonctionnelle’ (2003) 273-4 Économie rurale 61. 
65 Different regional approaches exist even within a Member State: Case C-428/07 Horvarth [2009] 
ECR I-06355; and J Hunt, ‘Devolution and differentiation: regional variation in EU law’ (2010) 30:3 
LS 421. 
66  M Dobbs, ‘Excluding coexistence of GMOs? The impact of the EU Commission’s 2010 
Recommendation on coexistence’ (2011) 20 RECIEL 180. 
67 M Dobbs, ‘Co-existence of GMOs in the EU – A Veritable Choice for Whom?’ in MN Cardwell and 
J McMahon (eds), Research Handbook on EU Agriculture Law (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
68 J Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law, (CUP, 2010). 
69 E.g. Appendix D of ‘Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) and 
the Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) on a request from the Commission on the use of antibiotic 
resistance genes as marker genes in genetically modified plants’ [2009] 7(3) The EFSA Journal, 1034 
1-81. 
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governance. They also impact upon the different issues in varying manners. Thus, 
whilst commonalities exist, depending on the issue considered there are considerable 
variations regarding for instance the degree of heterogeneity present, the relative 
capacity of the levels, the need to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ and the nature of the 
relevant externalities. Consequently, it is useful to differentiate between the various 
aspects central to GM cultivation and consider whether these should be regulated at 
different levels.70 In particular, a key division can be made between environmental 
and health protection on the one hand and other facets on the other hand (with trade 
considered as an overlapping feature/externality).	  
Issues at stake 
Regarding environmental and health protection, a range of factors impact especially 
upon the question of efficiency/output democracy. Here, firstly the capacity varies 
across the levels. As noted, lower levels hold greater knowledge and expertise 
regarding relevant local environmental, geographical and conditions as well as 
practices. However, higher levels tend to have access to broader scientific knowledge 
and expertise regarding GM technology and general impacts. Centralisation also 
enables multiple sources and viewpoints to be gathered before developing a final 
scientific opinion. Secondly, a general desire exists to avoid a potential race to the 
bottom – for instance, high levels of environmental and health protection are 
generally promoted in the EU context as reflected in the Treaties. However, complete 
decentralisation might encourage lax regulation to facilitate the increased use of GM 
crops and trade, thereby garnering economic benefits relative to other States or 
regions (prisoner’s dilemma). Thirdly, and related to the previous point, in light of the 
permeability of nature there is the real possibility of extraterritorial environmental and 
health impacts. Fourthly, more generally any measures will impact upon the trade of 
seeds and eventual products, indicating that further externalities need to be borne in 
mind – especially in the context of the EU’s internal market. 
It is arguable that these factors outweigh subsidiarity’s preference in favour of lower 
levels, due to a combination of externalities and the EU’s superior resources, and that 
therefore powers regarding environmental and health protection should usually be 
centralized. 71  This would encompass initial and subsequent assessments, the 
(re)authorisation (or revocation) decision and accompanying conditions, as well as 
more generally the setting of safety standards and best practices. Thus, the main role 
for lower levels would be funnelling information to the higher levels and 
implementing the resulting science-based decisions. 
However, the factors do not necessitate complete centralisation and two significant 
limitations arguably should apply, due primarily to scientific uncertainty in 
conjunction with the precautionary principle and the impact of local environmental, 
geographical and climatic conditions. Whilst externalities are still relevant, the 
capacity of the higher levels is not so obviously dominant. Further, the issues remain 
relevant to the lower levels and there are also considerations over risk diversification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Similarly regarding climate change and water: J Scott and M Maslin, ‘Carbon Trading Needs a 
Multi-Level Approach’ (2011) 7357 Nature 445; and OECD (n56), at 19. 
71 Cf. T Bernauer and L Caduff, ‘European Food Safety: Multilevel Governance, Re-Nationalization or 
Centralization?’ (2004) Working Paper No.3, Centre for Comparative and International Studies, ETH 
Zurich and University of Zurich, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1514454. 
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in case the central level makes ‘the wrong decision’.72 Firstly, this would call for 
flexibility regarding the assessment of evidence, whereby assessors at any level could 
consider new evidence73/different interpretations of existing evidence resulting in a 
conflicting opinion. 74  Secondly, it would call for flexibility regarding risk 
management, whereby other considerations such as morality or freedom of choice 
might grow in significance regarding decision-making and also national, regional or 
local decision-makers might aim for higher levels of environmental or health 
protection. Together these reflect a modified concept of scientific rationality, whereby 
science remains highly regarded but is not the source of absolute truth, leading to a 
more solid foundation in legitimacy.75 Clearly, to avoid being abused to justify any 
subjective and potentially irrational/discriminatory/protectionist measures, it would 
need effective controls. Thus, the central level (here the EU) should still determine if 
the alternative conclusions from the risk assessment were reasonable76 and whether 
the resulting measures were proportionate.  
However, the factors impact differently regarding land-use aspects other than 
environmental and health risks, such as agricultural policies, consumer choice and 
public morals. Here, in light of the relative significance of local knowledge and 
experience,77 the local levels are unlikely to suffer severe capacity gaps. There are 
also no further externalities (there is some limited impact upon cultivation in 
neighbouring territories and upon trade more generally). These factors together 
suggest that most of the powers should remain at the lower levels, with some limited 
controls at the higher levels to help manage the externalities. This would facilitate 
local considerations and conditions to be taken more effectively into account and 
reflect the society in question’s values.78 Nonetheless, whilst ideally such policy 
decisions should be made as low as feasible, pragmatically there must be a cut-off 
point. Logically, subnational legislative regions with relevant powers within their 
Member State should maintain these powers, as they have long established their 
desire and intent to act in this area in a manner that is potentially at odds with the 
national approach, even if finally they decide to mirror the overall national approach! 
Although seemingly a fait accompli, significant challenges exist in ensuring that these 
regions can actually avail of their powers, as seen below. If other subnational regions 
or lower levels are able to demonstrate sufficient cause (and capacity), then it may be 
appropriate that they also hold relevant policy-making powers.  
However, as with scientific elements, the issue is not that simple. In particular, the 
supposed heterogeneity regarding these broader policies and issues may not exist 
within various territories. In that case, the lower levels may not take the initiative to 
act. Consequently, these powers should be located with what appears to be the 
appropriate level initially (subnational or national), but with a fall-back towards the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 E.g. van Zeben (n47), 30. 
73 Including regarding relevant local conditions. 
74 E.g. M Dobbs, ‘Legalising general prohibitions on cultivation of genetically modified organisms’ 
(2010) 11 GLJ 1347, at Section B.I regarding the role of safeguard clauses. 
75 L Levidow, ‘Precautionary Uncertainty: Regulating GM Crops in Europe’ (2001) 31 Social Studies 
of Science 848. 
76 If not to be arbitrary, then the measures must be objectively based and the risk assessment should 
still play an important role. Any conclusions drawn from the assessment must logically flow. This 
approach is paralleled in: Commission’s Communication on the precautionary principle 
COM/2000/0001 final, p.9.  
77 See n35. 
78 Lee (n12), 122. 
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central level (national and EU) where not availed of – or alternatively, the central 
powers can act first with broad derogations then available for the lower levels. 
Furthermore, there is interaction and overlap with various disciplines and issues 
where the appropriate level(s) may be at the higher levels, e.g. protection of the 
internal market. This overlap calls for some central controls again over national and 
regional powers to avoid abuse or misuse. 
The complexity and dispersal of powers over the levels heightens both the challenge 
and need for coherency, without which both the decentralised and centralised 
approaches could risk being substantially undermined. Some vertical and horizontal 
coordination will be required due to the ordinary challenges for multilevel governance 
and ensuring efficiency, e.g. avoiding duplication or contradiction of measures where 
powers are shared between the different levels. However, coordination is also 
necessary to further the protection of heterogonous approaches; local cultivation 
policies cannot exist entirely independently, due especially to the challenges of 
coexistence. Thus, in apparent contradiction, this may involve some degree of 
harmonisation/centralisation. However, this may be achieved in an informal manner 
rather than through government. 
Overall, the initial exploration indicates that GM cultivation calls for varying 
approaches to its governance, depending on the issue at hand. Whilst the core policy-
making powers regarding environmental and health aspects should be situated 
predominately at the higher levels and therefore with the EU in this context, other 
elements should be predominately situated at lower levels, encompassing therein the 
national and subnational levels as appropriate. However, it is also essential that 
relevant complementary powers be held across the levels79 and structures be put in 
place to ensure coherency and effectiveness. Whilst the suggested allocation of 
powers is not definitive and further investigation is needed, it provides a starting point 
for analysing the distribution of powers within the EU. The following section 
examines the nature of the post-authorisation powers left to Member States and 
regions in light of these observations80 and considers whether changes are desirable 
and feasible. 
 
4. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU GM CULTIVATION 
REGIME?  
Fundamentally, the overall EU GM cultivation regime is highly harmonised. This is 
reflected in the legal base of the core legislation (Deliberate Release Directive 
2001/1881 and Regulations 1829/2003 on GM food and feed82 and 1830/2003 on the 
labelling and traceability of GMOs) 83  being Article 114 TFEU regarding the 
harmonisation of the internal market, rather than for instance Article 191 TFEU on 
the environment. This harmonisation places the predominate powers regarding 
authorisation, encompassing scientific elements and broader policy choices, at the EU 
level rather than at national or regional levels. Following EU authorisation, Member 
States and their regions may not hinder the free movement of the authorised seeds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This reflects the challenges in identifying a single optimal level: Lee (n11). 
80 The framework could be applied to authorisations similarly. 
81 [2001] OJ L106/1.  
82 [2003] OJ L 268/1.  
83 [2003] OJ L268/24. 
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(including for cultivation) or eventual products, except in accordance with EU law.84 
Consequently, the starting point for considering the post-authorisation powers of the 
Member States and subnational regions is that they operate within a highly centralised 
regime with a high degree of coherency in principle.  
However, EU law provides for a number of mechanisms whereby Member States, and 
potentially their subnational regions, may subsequently act unilaterally. The main 
existing mechanisms are safeguard clauses, an opt-out clause and a coexistence 
clause.  
 
4.1 Threats to the environment or human health: safeguard clauses 
Safeguard clauses, broadly understood, provide for the EU or Member States (but not 
expressly regions) to act swiftly post-authorisation where specific conditions are 
fulfilled. They focus heavily on environmental or human health protection, whereas 
these are mainly excluded from the other mechanisms. The core clauses enabling 
Member State action regarding GM cultivation are Article 23 of Directive 2001/18, 
Article 34 of Regulation 1829/2003 and Article 114(5) TFEU. However, a 
combination of their content (and interpretation thereof) and the applicable 
procedures/roles of the parties limits the clauses’ role and promotes a high degree of 
centralisation.85 
Initially, the Member States (or potentially regions) choose the measures based on 
their own assessments. However, the EU level determines whether the criteria are met 
and whether the measures are appropriate. Specifically, the Commission evaluates the 
measures (followed by the comitology procedure for Articles 23 and 34), typically 
relying heavily upon EFSA’s Opinions regarding the risks,86 with potential for review 
by the EU Courts. In principle therefore, the process is a highly centralised 
mechanism. In practice, it has not operated in such a manner in this context. To date, 
the Commission has not been able to lift national cultivation bans, despite considering 
them illegal,87 due to the blocking role of the Council in the comitology procedure.88 
However, the amended comitology procedure replaces the Council with an appeal 
committee and, whilst the appeal committee comprises of national representatives, 
there is no guarantee that it will replicate the Council’s or national executives’ views 
and approaches. Further, the measures can also be challenged by parties with standing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 M Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (Hart, 2014), 237-8 and 
246; and N de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market (OUP, 2014), 249-300 and 
349-382. 
85 Lee (n84), 225-234; FM Fleurke, ‘What use for Article 95(5) EC?’ (2008) 20(2) JEL 267; and 
Weimer (n12). 
86 See J Scott and E Vos, ‘The Juridification of Uncertainty; Observations on the Ambivalence of the 
Precautionary Principle within the EU and the WTO’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good 
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002). 
87 See COM(2005)161–169, ‘Proposals to Compel Member States to Remove Safeguard Measures as 
Unjustified’. 
88 E.g. Commission Decision 2008/495/EC concerning the provisional prohibition of the use and sale in 
Austria of genetically modified maize (Zea mays L. line MON810) pursuant to Directive 2001/18/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2008] OJ L172/25. 
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irrespective of the outcome of the comitology process, as occurred in Monsanto 
France recently.89    
The content and interpretation of the provisions further restrict their potential role, as 
exemplified by the requirement of ‘newness’. Article 23 and Article 114(5) TFEU 
require ‘new’ information or scientific evidence, and the Court of Justice (ECJ) 
recently interpreted Article 34 to this end also.90 The Courts have interpreted this 
criterion restrictively regarding Article 114(5) TFEU 91  and Article 34, 92  with a 
similarly restrictive approach likely for Article 23. This currently excludes for 
instance new (reasonable) interpretations of existing scientific evidence, despite 
support for this by AG Sharpston93 and the possibility to interpret Article 23 in 
particular more flexibly.94 This restrictive approach is reflected in the fact that the 
Commission and EFSA have yet to consider any such safeguard measures as justified, 
primarily due to a lack of relevant new or additional scientific information.95 
Furthermore, the ECJ recently imposed further serious restrictions in Monsanto 
France where it indicated that Article 34 (rather than Article 23) applied, where a GM 
crop was also authorised for food or feed.96 This reflects a further push by the EU 
towards centralisation, with significant impacts upon the process, the content and 
interpretation of the content.97 Firstly, Article 34 involves a ‘residual right’ that 
permits ‘emergency measures’ by the Member States only where the Commission 
does not act to take protective measures,98 whereas Article 23 leaves the initial right to 
derogate with the Member States.99 Secondly, Article 34 contains stricter criteria and, 
although capable of a flexible interpretation, 100  the ECJ made no reference to 
scientific uncertainty or the precautionary principle, in contrast with its earlier case-
law.101 This makes it increasingly difficult for Member States to rely upon divergent 
risk assessments and increases the standard of proof regarding risk.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 E.g. Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 Monsanto SAS and Others v Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la 
Pêche, [2011] ECR I-7763. 
90 Monsanto (France) (n89),  [76-8] in particular. 
91  E.g. Joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04 Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-4005. 
92 Monsanto (France) (n89), [76-8]; and Weimer (n12). 
93 See Opinion of 15 May 2007 of AG Sharpston in Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05 Land 
Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission [2007] ECR I-07141, [142]. 
94 As noted by T Hervey, ‘Regulation of Genetically Modified Products in a Multi-Level System of 
Governance: Science or Citizens?’ (2001) 10:3 RECIEL 321, fn72, Article 23 refers to ‘reassessments’. 
However, the phrasing in English indicates that reassessments should be affected due to new or 
additional information. Arguably, other versions (e.g. German) provide further support for a more 
flexible interpretation (different placing of commas and terminology). However, Case C-121/07 
Commission v France [2008] ECR I-9519 indicated that including reassessments/re-interpretations 
breached Directive 2001/18. 
95 COM(2005)161–169. Other criteria apply to each clause and are also applied strictly – See n85. 
96 Weimer (n12), 451; and Lee (n84), 232-4. 
97 M Lee, EU regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology, (Edward Elgar, 
2008), 92. 
98 Weimer (n12), 450. 
99 Lee (n84), 234. 
100 See Opinion of 22 March 2011 of AG Mengozzi in Monsanto (France) (n89). 
101 Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others [2003] ECR1-8105, [112]. 
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Regarding the risk management aspect, 102  the level of protection sought 
fundamentally affects any determination of whether the measures are proportionate. 
Due to the legal base in Article 114 TFEU and the degree of harmonisation 
(maximum), neither at the authorisation stage nor in availing of safeguard clauses 
may Member States unilaterally aim for a higher level of protection – the level of 
protection is that already chosen by the EU. 
Finally, as hinted at, the clauses do not guarantee subnational regions any role, but 
only refer to the States. Austria has demonstrated that subnational regions can attempt 
to rely upon the safeguard clauses even before the ECJ,103 but this role is dependent 
upon the support of their Member States. 
Consequently, the safeguard clauses are important regarding environmental and 
health protection, but whilst there is some multilevel governance it is not truly 
subsidiarity-based. As the ECJ stated recently, in light of Regulation 1829/2003’s 
objective ‘of avoiding artificial disparities in the treatment of a serious risk, the 
assessment and management of a serious and evident risk ultimately come under the 
sole responsibility of the Commission and the Council, subject to review by the 
European Union Courts.’104 The Member States and subnational regions’ potential to 
avail of the safeguard clauses is greatly restricted by the criteria and their restrictive 
interpretation at the EU level, leading to a high level of centralisation of the core 
policy-making powers and no effective decentralisation of complementary powers. If 
there were broad scientific certainty and all concerned wished for the same level of 
environmental and health protection, this might suffice. Indeed, it is appropriate that 
the EU retain the core powers regarding risk assessment especially. However, the role 
left to Member States and especially regions is excessively limited in light of the 
abovementioned characteristics of GM cultivation, including the on-going scientific 
uncertainty. 
 
Incorporating flexibility to facilitate subsidiarity-based multilevel governance? 
In light of the proposed appropriate division (Section 3), the current approach could 
be ameliorated by a number of key changes – either by adapting the text or 
interpretation of the safeguard clauses or providing new complementary mechanisms 
also focussed on environmental and health protection, whilst still retaining controls at 
the EU level. 
 
Firstly, regarding the risk assessments, the inclusion of different interpretations or 
even re-interpretations of existing information would reflect the continuing scientific 
uncertainty as noted above. Whilst technically possible through a more generous 
interpretation of existing provisions, this would most likely require legislative 
revision. Article 12 of the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation, which exemplifies this 
option, provides for Member State actions where their concerns are due to ‘new 
information or a reassessment of existing information’.105 Secondly, changes could be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Although customary in considering risk analysis, separating risk assessment and management is 
somewhat artificial. In practice, the components overlap and the process is necessarily circular and 
iterative if to be effective: e.g. YY Haimes, Risk Modeling, Assessment and Management, (2nd edn, 
Wiley, 2005), 21-22 and 54-8. 
103 E.g. Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05 Land Oberösterreich (n93). 
104 Monsanto (France) (n89), [78]. 
105 Regulation 258/97, [1997] OJ L43/1. 
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made to facilitate Member States in upholding a higher standard of protection, e.g. 
through incorporating such a possibility directly into Articles 23 or 34, or changing 
the predominate legal basis of the GM legislation to Article 192 TFEU.106 This would 
thereby impact upon any determination of the proportionality of resulting protective 
measures. Thirdly, as is discussed in Section 4.3 below, the clauses could be adapted 
to facilitate the subnational bodies in acting in the same manner as the Member States, 
at least to the extent permitted by their national constitutional frameworks. The 
obvious alternative to adjusting the (approach to) safeguard clauses would be to 
amend the opt-out clause to include environmental and health concerns, including 
where already dealt with at the EU level, but with some control by the EU level once 
more.  
 
These changes would facilitate lower levels acting where there are real concerns 
regarding the environment or human health, without surreptitiously availing of other 
mechanisms, and whilst still retaining overall EU control and ensuring coordination. 
However, they would also significantly alter the current approach, lead to some de-
harmonisation and likely prove problematic and contentious – with external and 
internal pressures making such changes unlikely.107 This is highlighted by the 2010 
Cultivation Package and Directive 2015/412, which repeatedly confirm that 
environmental and health aspects are to remain harmonised, 108  despite the de-
harmonisation of other aspects. 
 
The most significant external pressure relates to the SPS Agreement, which is pivotal 
to discussions on GM cultivation.109 The SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the 
WTO’s Dispute Panel and the Appellate Board,110 requires that State SPS measures 
generally be based on an appropriate risk assessment.111 Although challenging, the 
Agreement does not pose any insurmountable obstacles to the proposed changes. 
Firstly, States may determine their own level of protection. 112  Secondly, the 
possibility of valid minority views and diverging opinions found within a risk 
assessment is recognised by the WTO,113 such that a ‘single risk assessment might 
conceivably provide a basis for different types of SPS measures’.114 Thirdly, where 
there is insufficient scientific evidence in light of the level chosen,115 States may take 
provisional measures based on available pertinent information, whilst they seek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Member States could thereby aim for a higher level of environmental protection under Article 193 
TFEU. They would also not require new information, but would still need to comply with EU internal 
market law: de Sadeleer (n84), 350-7. This would denote a clear change from maximum to minimum 
harmonization. 
107 Randour, Janssens and Delreux, (n6). 
108 E.g. COM(2010)380; COM(2010)375; and Directive 2015/412, Recitals 6 and 14. 
109 Lee (n97), 211. 
110 See J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – A Commentary (OUP, 
2009) and especially v-x and 76-138 regarding the scientific aspects. In the context of the EU regime, 
see Lee (n97), 211-222. 
111 ‘European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products’, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, DSR 2006:III, 847 (EC Biotech). For further see 
Annex A, pt.4 of the SPS Agreement; Hormones, para 200; and Lee (n97), 215. 
112 Article 3.3 and 4.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
113 Hormones, para 194. 
114 EC Biotech, pt. 7.3060. 
115  See United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones Dispute 
WT/DS320/AB/R, paras 703 and 725 in particular (Hormones II); and Scott (n110), vii-ix. 
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additional information.116 States also may rely upon new evidence that, whilst ‘falling 
short of a risk assessment’, 117  nonetheless casts doubt on whether the existing 
sufficient evidence ‘still permits a sufficiently objective assessment of risk’.118 Thus, 
the flexible approach proposed could be facilitated by the SPS Agreement, provided 
that the States base their measures upon a suitable risk assessment or, where there is 
insufficient scientific evidence, other available pertinent information. 
 
The vehement rejection of sharing powers regarding risk assessments and 
management is likely due to internal pressures. One such pressure is the desire to 
support the perception of EFSA as a source of objective expertise and of the 
rigorousness of the authorisation process and overall regime– a desire heightened by a 
range of food and health scandals, including ones regarding BSE/vCJD and more 
recently horsemeat.119 This operates in conjunction with the related internal pressure 
of the internal market, which is generally promoted through maximum harmonisation. 
Hence, a desire for tightly controlled safeguard clauses. Even Article 12 of the Novel 
Foods Regulation appears likely to be repealed when the legislation is updated,120 with 
the safeguard clause in the General Food Law121 applying instead – one that does not 
specifically include measures based on reassessments of information and similarly to 
Article 34 of Regulation 1829/2003 leaves only a residual role to the Member 
States.122  
 
Yet, the resulting fixation on maximum harmonisation of the risk components to the 
exclusion of any flexibility for Member States or regions is neither logical nor 
necessary. Firstly, such changes would involve limited de-harmonisation with 
negligible impact on the internal market compared to the recent opt-out clause. This is 
especially the case as the EU would still retain ultimate control and the EU level of 
protection is high. Even if it were considered to be technically minimum 
harmonisation, the tightly regulated regime would not give Member States a carte 
blanche and would still approximate maximum harmonisation.123 Secondly, such an 
approach might be understandable where there is scientific certainty, but this is not 
the case here. Indeed, it reflects issues that arose regarding BSE/vCJD where the 
impact on trust was more severe due to the portrayal of scientifically established 
safety even though scientific uncertainty was abundant.124 Implying that the products 
must be safe because of a positive Opinion by EFSA runs a similar risk. It also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement; and Scott (n110), vii-ix. 
117 Scott (n110), vii.  
118 Hormones II, para 725. 
119 E.g. L Levidow and S Carr, ‘Europeanising Advisory Expertise: The role ‘independent, objective 
and transparent’ scientific advice in agri-biotech regulation’ (2007) 25 Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Politics 880. 
120 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel 
foods, COM(2013)894, which would replace the 1997 Novel Foods Regulation, contains no such 
safeguard clause. 
121 Regulation 178/2002/EC, [2002] OJ L31/1. 
122 See Lee (n97), 92, regarding Article 34 of Regulation 1829/2003 and Article 54 of the General Food 
Law. 
123 C Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law: Current Controversies in Law, (Routledge, 
2013) at 44. 
124  E Millstone and P van Zwanenberg, ‘A crisis of trust: for science, scientists or for 
institutions?’(2000) Nature America 1307. 
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conflicts with Article 30 of the General Food Law, which expressly encourages 
dialogue between competent authorities and EFSA, with scope to include differing 
opinions within EFSA’s Opinions. By indicating that some flexibility is available 
where there are real concerns, irrespective of the ‘newness’ of the supporting 
evidence, it actually helps foster trust in the overall system and thereby in authorised 
products. Further, the current practice of (unapproved) safeguard measures already 
challenges both the internal market and the perception of the authorisation process 
and regime’s safety, rather than merely just the individual product.  
 
Even so, unless other forces are brought to bear on the Commission and the EU as a 
whole, it is unlikely that these changes will occur. One potential source of pressure 
relates to the use of the new opt-out clause (Article 26b of Directive 2001/18). This 
provision can be seen as a last-ditch attempt to bolster the EU’s control over the risk 
components of the controversial and battered GM cultivation regime. In principle, if 
Member States or regions continue to impose bans under the safeguard clauses and 
maintain that their bans truly are for environmental or human health concerns, rather 
than availing of Article 26b, some decentralisation of these aspects might occur. It is 
to Article 26b and its neighbour in the coexistence provision that we now turn. 
 
4.2 (Sub)National restrictions on cultivation: Article 26 of Directive 2001/18 
Articles 26a (since 2003) and 26b (since April 2015) provide the Member States with 
some significant powers to act unilaterally and restrict GM cultivation. Together, their 
fundamental purpose is to facilitate the Member States in choosing whether to engage 
in GM cultivation or not and, if so, to what degree – despite EU authorisation and 
without contesting the EU risk assessment or management decisions.  
Article 26b – ‘opt-out’ clause 
Following Member States’ requests,125 a Commission Proposal126 and subsequent 
lengthy and difficult negotiations at the EU level,127 political agreement was reached 
on an opt-out clause. The result was Directive 2015/412, which inserted Article 26b 
(and the transitional Article 26c) into Directive 2001/18. Directive 2015/412 is based 
on Article 114 TFEU on harmonisation, whilst Recital 6 expressly refers to Article 
2(2) TFEU, according to which Member States ‘shall again exercise their competence 
to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.’ 
Consequently, it aims to restore to Member States an element of power regarding 
post-authorisation cultivation.128 Article 26b thereby provides for Member States to 
demand a geographical restriction from the notifier (via the Commission) during the 
(re-)authorisation process129 and/or unilaterally impose such a geographical restriction 
at any time. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 See (n1). 
126 COM(2010)375. 
127  M Weimer, ‘Risk regulation, GMOs, and the challenges to deliberation in EU governance: 
politicization and scientification as co-producing trends’ 2014-03 Amsterdam Centre for European 
Law and Governance Working Paper Series, at 33. 
128 Regarding the initial Proposal, see: COM(2010)380, Section 3; and Weimer (n127), 32-3. 
129 If the notifier does not refuse the demand, then the (re-)authorisation application will automatically 
be adjusted to reflect the restriction. 
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Crucially, Article 26b omits significant procedural limitations proposed by a Greek 
compromise130 in 2014.131 The Greek compromise required that any Member State 
wishing to restrict cultivation of a GM crop firstly must negotiate with a notifier 
during the (re-)authorisation process. This raises concerns of either substantial delays 
in authorisation, whilst Member States consult their populace/regions each and every 
time, or alternatively conclusion of the authorisation process without Member States 
having sufficient opportunity to consult or react.132 Only if a notifier refused a 
restriction to a Member State might that same Member State then avail of the opt-out. 
Consequently, the compromise imposed significant restrictions and created a sense of 
urgency that would not readily facilitate consideration of regional viewpoints, 
changes of mind or developments in approaches.133 The only flexibility in this regard 
would be if there were ‘new objective circumstances’, with no guarantee that this 
would be interpreted liberally. Although Recital 13 of Directive 2015/412 creates an 
expectation that most restrictions will be implemented at the (re-)authorisation stage, 
i.e. through making a demand of the notifier, the Member States may now opt-out at 
any stage whether they requested a geographical restriction previously or not. 
 
However, Article 26b still imposes criteria on the Member States seeking to impose 
restrictions unilaterally. As with earlier proposed formulations, these restrictions must 
not impact upon authorised crops already planted and must be in compliance with EU 
law.134 In particular, any measures must aim to fulfil a legitimate objective in a 
proportionate and non-discriminatory manner. 135  In this respect, Article 26b(3) 
includes a non-exhaustive list of objectives that encompasses agricultural policy, 
socioeconomic impacts and prevention of admixture. Importantly, as not harmonised, 
the Member States may determine the level of protection.  
 
Further, unlike the 2010 Proposal,136 Article 26b(3) includes ‘environmental policy 
objectives’ provided that they do not conflict with the environmental risk assessment 
carried out in accordance with the EU legislation. Although likely to be interpreted 
strictly, this supplements the overall environmental protection, for instance, in the 
case of local factors not considered during authorisation.  
 
Overall, Article 26b returns significant powers to the Member States regarding 
policies/objectives most suited to be dealt with nationally or lower. Combined with 
Article 26a discussed below, Member States may make policy choices and take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Annex to Council of the EU, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or 
prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory – political agreement, Brussels, 28 May 2014 
(10271/14).  
131  Council of the EU, Press Release, 12 June 2014 (10415/14): 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/143178.pdf. 
132 EPEC, ‘Evaluation of the EU legislative framework in the field of cultivation of GMOs under 
Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) 1829/2003, and the placing on the market of GMOs as or in 
products under Directive 2001/18/EC’, Final Report to DG SANCO, March 2011: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/evaluation/docs/gmo_cultivation_report_en.pdf, 96-7 and 
106-7. 
133 EPEC, ibid, 106-7. 
134 S Poli ‘The Commission’s new approach to the cultivation of genetically modified organisms’ 
(2010) 1 EJRR 339, at 342-3; and Lee (n84), 246. 
135 COM(2010)375, Recital 8 of the Proposed Regulation and Section 3.1.2 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum; and Lee (n11), 374-8. 
136 COM(2010)375. 
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unilateral actions without needing to link them to the safeguard clauses.137 Although 
Member States will need to tread carefully in identifying a relevant objective 
justification at both EU and WTO levels, it is feasible in principle.138 Further, if 
notifiers agree to self-impose geographical limitations, this would arguably avoid 
WTO law, similarly to voluntary GM-free regions, as WTO law is aimed at States139 
and these are private, non-mandatory measures in appearance.140 Consequently, the 
adopted text provides the Member States with significant flexibility, balanced by the 
obligation to justify restrictions where the notifier rejects their demands and not to 
affect authorised plants already planted.  
 
However, despite the reference to decisions at the ‘national, regional or local level’ 
within the Explanatory Memorandum141 and support by academics, the Committee of 
Regions and the European Parliament for such a role,142 the regions remain without 
any independent powers. Even those subnational regions that have relevant legislative 
powers devolved to them under the national constitutional frameworks are reliant 
upon their Member States to support them in availing of Article 26b.143  
 
With the exception of the subnational regions, considered in Section 4.3 below, there 
is clearly a shift of core powers downwards that reflects subsidiarity-based multilevel 
governance. However, this shift increases the importance of ensuring appropriate 
coordination within and between Member States, which is highlighted by 
consideration of coexistence. 
 
Article 26a – coexistence clause 
 
Despite the practical challenges noted above, the EU’s stance is that coexistence is 
possible and should be striven for, without excluding any agri-type in principle.144 
However, to achieve this, the EU acknowledges that some restrictions may be 
necessary to limit admixture. Article 26a thereby permits Member States to create 
‘appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in other products’ 
predominately in order to protect consumer and producer choice. From 2017, Article 
26a as amended by Directive 2015/412, will also require Member States to create 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Hervey (n94), 330 considered that the system’s focus on science and risks ‘obfuscate[d] competing 
interests’. 
138 Dobbs (n67), Section 6(b). 
139 Panel Report, Argentina - Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import of finished 
leather, Panel Report, WT/DS155/R, para. 11.18. 
140 However, if there is ‘sufficient governmental involvement’ then the measures could fall foul of 
GATT and would need to be justified, e.g. potentially if States negotiate with notifiers to obtain their 
agreement: Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, para. 10.56.  
141 COM(2010)375, 6. 
142 Hunt (n65); European Parliament, Legislative Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards 
the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in their Territory 
(COM(2010)0375–C7-0178/2010–2010/0208(COD)), 8; and Committee of the Regions, Opinion on 
‘Freedom for Member States to Decide on the Cultivation of Crops in their Territory’, [2011] OJ 
C104/13, [18]. 
143  M Dobbs, ‘Choosing to go GM-Free?’, EU Law Analysis, 24th March 2015, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/choosing-to-go-gm-free-new-eu-legal.html.  
144 2003 Co-existence Recommendation, Guidelines, Section 1.1; COM(2006)104, Section 3; and 
Commission Staff Working document, SEC(2006)313, annexed to COM(2006)104, 6 and 8. 
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cross-border measures. In doing so, it provides Member States with further powers 
and also could facilitate, or destroy, coherency in the regime. 
Despite the apparent de-harmonisation by Article 26a, the Commission subsequently 
took measures that softly harmonised the area in a quite restrictive manner.145 This is 
exemplified by the creation of the 2003 Co-existence Recommendation146 and the 
Network Group for the Exchange and Coordination of Information Concerning 
Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops (COEX-NET) 
that comprises of Member States but is chaired by the Commission. These two 
elements furthered a relatively homogenous approach reflecting the Commission’s 
understanding of coexistence – focused on producer choice and specifically the 
economic impact on a producer’s ability to cultivate their chosen agri-type (linked to 
labelling requirements).147  
However, wide variations in coexistence measures continued, some Member States 
did not create any measures148 and regions were declaring themselves as GM-free. 
The Commission eventually responded with its 2010 Coexistence Recommendation, 
replacing the 2003 Recommendation. This takes a somewhat more flexible approach 
and notes that producers may wish to aim for minimal or even zero admixture and 
Member States ‘should consider the possibility’ of creating exclusion zones or GM-
free regions where proportionate.149 Further, the ECJ has indicated that Article 26a 
may permit ‘geographically restricted prohibitions’.150 Although some significant 
limitations remain151 and the measures must still comply with EU law, nonetheless the 
Member States have increased flexibility regarding the proportionality of the 
measures in particular. This is further complemented by Article 26b(3) also providing 
for opt-outs to avoid admixture. 
This renewed flexibility regarding coexistence measures provides significant powers 
to the Member States – whether considered ‘core’ or ‘complementary’ – appropriate 
in light of the nature of GM cultivation. Unfortunately, regions are once again 
dependent upon their States to notify and support any coexistence measures, despite 
the Commission expressly noting that coexistence measures may need to be 
developed at a regional or local level.152 Further, Article 26a also emphasizes the 
significance of coordination and communication in particular between areas/levels 
with distinct approaches to GM crops. Without this, even coexistence in the short 
term may prove fanciful. This however appears to be lacking in a structured and 
comprehensive fashion.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 M Lee, ‘The Governance of Coexistence Between GMOs and Other Forms of Agriculture: A Purely 
Economic Issue?’ (2008) 20:2 JEL 193, 196-9. 
146 [2003] OJ L189/36. 
147 Article 4, Regulation 1830/2003, exempts produce from GM labelling requirements where the 
presence of authorised GMOs is adventitious and technically unavoidable and below the threshold 
(currently 0.9%). 
148 E.g. SEC(2006) 313. 
149 2010 Co-existence Recommendation, Guidelines, Section 2.4. 
150 Case C-36/11 Pioneer Hi Bred Italia Srl v Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali 
(judgment of 6 September 2012, nyr), [75]. 
151 E.g. If no alternative agri-type exists that could be affected by admixture, then restrictive measures 
are not warranted under Article 26a. Further, exclusion zones under Article 26a to protect 
consumer/producer choice could potentially breach Article XI GATT without being justifiable under 
Article XX: Dobbs (n138), Section 5. 
152 2010 Co-existence Recommendation, Guidelines, Section 1.3. 
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To achieve a coherent approach, (i) information regarding the potential usefulness of 
coexistence measures in theory and practice would need to be available and shared 
with all levels; (ii) information regarding local conditions, farming practices, agri-
types cultivated and coexistence measures developed across the EU would need to be 
shared; and (iii) some minimal harmonising principles or standards would need to be 
agreed in particular to manage cross-territorial issues including within Member States. 
The first is fulfilled to an extent by three EU research projects (now concluded) and 
the European Coexistence Bureau (2008 onwards), which have conducted important 
(centralised) scientific research regarding coexistence.153 Although quite theoretical 
due to minimal EU GM cultivation, this research is crucial, with the Bureau providing 
non-binding technical reference documents that can assist multilevel decision-making. 
However, whilst the Bureau’s mandate includes ‘contributing towards preventing 
cross-border problems’,154 it does not deal with general concepts such as cross-
territorial obligations and liability as beyond its current mandate and scope.155 The 
second is fulfilled to an extent through the reports gathered on coexistence measures 
and registers of GM cultivation, but only some components are included. In addition, 
whilst COEX-NET facilitates further communication of information between the 
Member States, it omits key actors at the lower levels and only plays an informal role. 
The third is fulfilled to an extent via the Coexistence Recommendation, but it is 
scanty on general principles and the permissive nature of Article 26a means that 
Member States need not create any coexistence measures and undermines any attempt 
to establish a general framework of measures. Whilst Directive 2015/412 imposes a 
new obligation upon Member States to create cross-border measures by April 2017, 
this does not encompass internal measures even where regions take distinct 
approaches. Consequently, whilst Article 26a highlights the need for coherency and 
has the potential to facilitate it, it currently does not ensure it. 
Article 26’s support of Multilevel Governance? 
Overall, Article 26 decentralises significant powers to the national level whilst 
retaining some EU control, which reflects the nature of GM cultivation and the 
application of subsidiarity to an extent. However, the regional role is not guaranteed 
and there is a significant lack of coherency. The adoption of Article 26b heightens the 
challenge and urgency of the situation, as GM cultivation will likely increase within 
the EU and concurrently some territories will aim to be GM-free. Some coordination 
is required if Articles 26a and 26b are to have any long-term practical value. 
In order to improve vertical and horizontal coordination and communication, a 
number of steps could be taken. The initial change would be to require the creation of 
coexistence measures, even if to merely indicate that the existing national law will 
apply and how. This would have to encompass internal measures also, rather than just 
cross-border measures. Where Member States (or regions) do not create coexistence 
measures, then it might be necessary to impose default coexistence measures. The 
second change would be to develop a loose coordinating framework or set of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 MR Grossman, ‘Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops in the 
European Union: The Community Framework’ in Bodiguel and Cardwell (n12), 138-40. 
154  Mandate of European Coexistence Bureau as of May 
2012:http://ecob.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/MandateofECoB_001.pdf, 2. 
155 M Czarnak-Klos and E Rodríguez-Cerezo, Best practice documents for coexistence of genetically 
modified crops with conventional and organic farming: 1. Maize crop production, (2010) European 
Coexistence Bureau, JRC, IPTS, 45. 
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principles for the interaction of approaches between regions, internally within the 
Member States and between the Member States – essentially a coexistence framework 
for the entirety of the EU that would respect the choices made at the lower levels. 
This would reflect but also go beyond the current Guidelines, to set down general 
principles for instance regarding: protection of existing agri-types (whether GM or 
non-GM) generally; (non-)provision of compensation for producers who are 
detrimentally affected due to GM cultivation, coexistence measures or application of 
Article 26b; obligations to avoid cross-border admixture; and appropriate protection 
of official GM-Free locations following application of Article 26b. 
 
The third change would be to improve communication vertically and horizontally to 
ensure that all relevant bodies and levels are suitably informed. To this end COEX-
NET’s role could be developed, with future interaction involving those at regional and 
local levels also. This would facilitate both the gathering and sharing of valuable 
information in developing, amending and implementing measures as appropriate. As 
well as facilitating the respect of various approaches at lower levels or in 
neighbouring regions in an efficient manner, through ensuring that no conflicting or 
unnecessary measures were taken, it would also allow for the sharing of practical 
experiences and knowledge. This would work in conjunction with the existing system 
that requires monitoring and traceability of GM crops. 
 
Whilst these changes might seem like an intrusion into Member State competence, it 
would only be minimum harmonisation. The first is merely an extension of the 
obligation imposed by Directive 2015/412 regarding the creation of measures to 
address cross-border admixture. Whilst the creation of default coexistence measures 
would be significant, they would only apply where the Member States had failed to 
act and therefore continues to reflect the concept of subsidiarity. The second could be 
achieved via soft law and would simply be a revised form of the Coexistence 
Guidelines – ones that reflect the impact that Article 26b and future authorisations 
will have on the regime and the need for cohesion. Similarly extending the role of 
COEX-NET and the nature of the participants involved would be difficult to object to 
in light of its non-binding nature.  
Consequently, Article 26a adds further powers to those granted to the Member States 
under Article 26b and also provides for a system that could, if adapted appropriately, 
facilitate the necessary communication and coordination. In order to achieve a system 
based on a more effective version of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance 
regarding aspects other than environmental or human health protection, it would seem 
that Article 26a merely requires some further depth and bolstering. However, this 
ignores the serious challenges regarding the role of the regions. 
 
4.3 Further consideration of the regions? 
 
As noted above, subsidiarity-based multilevel governance supports providing the 
lower levels (encompassing all relevant regions) with powers mirroring those 
advocated above for the Member States. Yet, a significant issue that crops up 
repeatedly is the subordinate position of the regions within the EU regime. Although 
there are key roles that individual regions could, and occasionally do, play in this 
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context,156 the EU does little to enable this. Further, whilst the Conference of 
European Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG) and the Committee of the 
Regions have important and growing roles, this does not suffice where it is the very 
heterogeneity of the issue and territories that has called for regional powers.157 
Instead, the regions remain in a precarious position, predominately reliant upon their 
Member States to support them at the EU level, e.g. through notifying safeguard 
measures or requesting opt-outs. 
 
Whilst regions may be adequately represented by their Member State, a region may 
wish to develop a policy that conflicts with national policy or just is not strongly 
supported by them. Dialogue may prove effective, due to the consequences of the 
internal political fall-out or potential legal action against the State for breach of EU 
law due to regional measures. However, the relationship between them may be such 
as the regions will pay for any breaches (as in the UK), the State may decide that it is 
worth the risk to maintain their own national policy irrespective of regional policy or 
to use it as a strong negotiating tool to gather regional concessions (even where the 
region has internal competence for these matters), or the context might just mean that 
the State does not act in time (e.g. to opt-out before authorised crops are planted and 
therefore cannot be uprooted). Consequently, to achieve effective subsidiarity-based 
multilevel governance, the role of the regions needs significant bolstering – within the 
Member States and at the EU level.  
 
To achieve this, a potential solution might be to include reference to regions within 
the relevant EU provisions. Clearly, this would still require varying degrees of 
controls over the use of powers and steps to ensure coherency – increasingly 
important with the further decentralisation of powers. Thus, regions might be 
permitted to create coexistence measures or request opt-outs, whilst leaving the 
overall/residual powers to the Member States so that they can create a national policy 
that facilitates regional action within it and, where the regions have not acted, 
provides for the general policy to encompass the regions also. Similarly, the regions 
could take safeguard measures, but with the same controls in place as for Member 
States. However, even more so than with the Member States, allocating relevant 
powers to the appropriate subnational bodies is not a simple issue, as for example it 
also asks what nature of regions should have policy-making powers and whether the 
EU can and should step in to support them.  
 
Any transfer of powers is always challenging, but this is a relationship traditionally 
governed by the Member States and regions together. Whilst the EU generally is 
accepting of further delegation of powers within Member States, provided that EU 
law is still complied with,158 it is an entirely different matter to attempt to carry out 
this delegation itself or alternatively require Member States to do so. This is arguably 
a significant interference with national governance and State competence to determine 
the division of relevant legislative powers internally. 159 Indeed, despite internal 
pressures from the various regions, Committee of Regions, Parliament and REGLEG, 
as noted above, the Commission and Council avoided providing the regions with 	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157 Weatherill (n22), 19-25. 
158 Case 227/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 1. 
159 J Hunt, ‘Ploughing their own furrow: subnational regions and the regulation of GM crop cultivation’ 
(2012) 13 CYELS 135, 159; and Weatherill (n22), 2-3. 
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express powers in Article 26b or a substantively strengthened role more generally. For 
instance, whilst the Lisbon Treaty provides national parliaments with a role in 
ensuring compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality,160 it is up to the national 
parliaments to include regional parliaments ‘where appropriate’.161 
Yet EU measures to support the regions would not necessarily involve interfering 
directly in the internal relationships and national division of powers and 
responsibilities. The EU could simply adjust its legislation to facilitate subnational 
regions that hold relevant powers within their nation-state to act in the EU context 
also - akin to the Commission’s propositions in its White Paper on Governance.162 
Alternatively, the EU could require Member States to involve competent regional or 
other bodies, as done in the case of partnership agreements regarding Cohesion policy 
for instance. 163  In both of these examples, the EU expressly notes that such 
approaches are to be in accordance with the existing national constitutional and 
administrative arrangements; arguably such changes would merely prevent the EU 
undermining the existing roles of regions nationally and thereby would be ‘leaving 
them alone’.164  
However, it should be noted that there are serious limitations with these proposals, 
besides achieving the political agreement to make the reforms! With the former, 
firstly, non-legislative regional bodies would still be left to negotiate as normal with 
their Member States. Secondly, it would also leave the contradiction whereby 
legislative regions wishing to impose restrictions might be able to act according to 
their own policies, but those wishing to cultivate GM crops in contrast with their 
Member State wishing to be GM-free nationally would still be reliant upon their State 
to respect their wishes in narrowing the geographical scope of any Article 26b 
application. If the region were to be able practically to cultivate relevant GM crops 
without undermining the Member State’s ability to remain GM-free elsewhere, it 
would seem logical that they should hold the powers to make such a decision – with 
coordination then between the regions and with the Member State to promote 
coexistence as best possible. With the latter, the regions would be unlikely to have a 
determinative say in the final decisions. Nonetheless, whilst not ideal from the 
perspective of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance, either option would at least 
be a step in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
This article aimed to outline a potential normative framework for determining where 
to allocate policy-making powers regarding GM cultivation in the EU context, in the 
form of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance. It also aimed to analyse the nature 
and extent of the main controls left to Member States and subnational regions 
regarding GM cultivation post-authorisation in light of this framework. As noted 
above, whether these mechanisms currently fulfil the criteria effectively depends in 
particular on whether the core powers are located at the appropriate level(s), 
complementary powers are located at the other levels and relevant coordination exists 	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162 COM(2001)428, 9. 
163 Article 5, Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, [2013] OJ L347/320. 
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both vertically and horizontally to ensure broad coherency across and throughout the 
levels (without necessarily amounting to harmonisation of policy content or 
implementation measures). 
The EU GM cultivation regime presents an apparently haphazard and contradictory 
approach, with continued harmonisation of some elements (authorisation and 
safeguard measures) and softer harmonisation of others (coexistence measures 
initially), but with significant and extremely unusual elements of de-harmonisation 
also (later approach to coexistence measures and Article 26b). Yet upon closer 
examination a pattern emerges, which distinguishes between environmental and 
health protection on the one hand and other legitimate objectives on the other.  
The combination of pressures within this contentious area has led to a division of 
powers within the EU. The EU has fortified its hold over the core powers regarding 
health and environmental risks, in principle at least. However, the EU has 
increasingly decentralised post-authorisation powers regarding other legitimate 
objectives – thereby enabling national restrictions. As this article argues that the 
appropriate level is the EU for the former powers and the Member States and regions 
for the latter powers, this approach would appear to indicate a clear, gradual move 
towards effective operation of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance.  
However, the discussion above also demonstrates that the evaluation is not so clear-
cut, even following Article 26b’s enactment. Firstly, the regions still play a 
subordinate role even where they should hold some relevant powers. Secondly, the 
existence of an appropriate level for the core powers does not mean that other levels 
should not have complementary powers related to the same issue or objective also – 
powers that are lacking regarding environmental and health risks especially. Thirdly, 
the provision of relevant powers at the appropriate levels needs to be balanced with 
the coordination and cohesion of policy and this is yet to be achieved satisfactorily – 
this is extremely important considering the nature of agriculture and the environment, 
the challenges for coexistence and the potential expansion of GM cultivation in some 
parts of the EU in the future. Consequently, to achieve effective subsidiarity-based 
multilevel governance in light of the above analysis, further (contentious) steps are 
required. 
In conclusion, it should be recalled that subsidiarity-based multilevel governance will 
not act as a panacea for the governance of GM crops, whether within the EU or 
beyond – the area is too contentious and too complicated due to the very nature of 
GM cultivation. Further, the discussion above is naturally limited in scope, e.g. 
regarding the range of issues/interests covered and the depth of the examination, and 
others may well argue that the concept should apply differently. In particular, further 
in-depth investigation will be needed regarding how the Member States, regions and 
indeed producers react to the opportunities and challenges that now face them in light 
of Article 26b and the likelihood of future authorisations165 – as highlighted by the 
conflict within Germany over whether the Länder or the Federal State should 
implement Article 26b.166 However, it is hoped that this discussion will challenge 	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others to consider proactively where and how the powers ought to be divvied up 
across the levels and provides a focus point for that debate.  
 
